The Current Economic Crisis and Lessons for Economic Theory by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
Presidential Address
The Current Economic Crisis and Lessons for
Economic Theory
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Uris Hall, Room 814, Columbia University 3022 Broadway, New York, NY 10027, USA.
Eastern Economic Journal (2009) 35, 281–296. doi:10.1057/eej.2009.24
These are exciting times: the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the
first global recession in the new era of globalization, and a new President committed
to restructuring national priorities, reforming our education, health, and energy
sectors, eliminating some long standing distortions arising from corporate welfare,
and restructuring our tax code. For economists who have fought long for many of
these ideas, the President’s budget was a moment of celebration. The final
recognition that the atmosphere is a global public good, that we have failed to price
one of the most scarce economic resources, and that going forward we would do so,
was music to an economist’s ear.
There will be political battles ahead. Special interests will try to block many of the
reforms. The future of our nation will depend in no small measure on the outcome of
those battles.
Today, however, I do not want to dwell on these great initiatives. I want to
address two issues. The first is a matter of immediacy: what should we do about our
failed banks? The second is a matter of reflection: what role did we, the economics
profession, or more precisely, what role did some of the ideas that had become
fashionable, even dominant, play in causing this crisis? What lessons will or should
we take away? How should it affect what we teach, what we advise governments to
do, and what our research agenda is?
THE CRISIS
Turning first to the crisis. We have at long last emerged from the paralysis, from the
period of denial, from the notion that recovery was around the corner. For years, it
has been clear that America’s growth was not sustainable. It was based on a real
estate bubble, which sustained a consumption boom. America was living beyond its
means.
Alan Greenspan may have been right that you could not be sure that there was a
bubble until after it broke, but policy-makers are supposed to make decisions based
on the analysis of risk. The likelihood that there was a bubble was increasingly clear;
and the more housing prices grew, the greater the likelihood that the eventual
crash would be disastrous. How could prices continue to grow, especially for
housing for lower and middle-income individuals, as incomes stagnated? One
doesn’t have to have a Ph.D. to know that you can’t spend more than 100 percent of
your income on housing. Over inflated housing prices allowed Americans to take
out hundreds of billions of dollars in mortgage equity withdrawals, in 1 year alone
an estimated US$900 billion.
It has also long been clear what was required: a stimulus package, a program
to deal with the housing market, and a program to deal with the financial sector.
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For months, nothing was done on the first two, and what was done on the third was
totally ineffective. It is such a relief that finally something is being done that
I hesitate to raise a note of criticism. But regrettably, I do not believe we are doing
enough, or the right thing, in any of these areas. Let me be clear: what we are doing
is much, much better than doing nothing, or doing what we were doing. It will make
a difference, but it is likely not enough. A year from now the economy will remain
weak, the housing problems will still be with us, and our banks will still be ailing.
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Before turning to what we should be doing, I want to spend a moment discussing the
global context. The current financial crisis, which began in the US, then spread to
Europe, has now become global. Even emerging markets and less developed
countries that managed their economy well, resisted the bad lending practices, held
high levels of foreign exchange reserves, did not purchase toxic mortgages, and did
not allow their banks to engage in excessive risk taking through derivatives are likely
to become embroiled and to suffer as a result. Any global solution — short-term
measures to stabilize the current situation and long-term measures to make another
recurrence less likely — must pay due attention to impacts on these countries.Without
doing so, global economic stability cannot be restored, and economic growth, as well
as poverty reduction worldwide, will be threatened.
The countries in East Asia emerged from their crisis a decade ago relatively
quickly, because they could turn to export markets. Last year, the one source of
economic strength in the US was exports. But now, with most countries in a
downturn, we cannot export our way out of this crisis.
A global crisis requires a global response, yet so far our responses are national.
Each country will be focusing on its own trade-offs, the stimulus that it gets
from spending versus the costs in increased national indebtedness, for example.
The benefits to other countries from increased spending are externalities, which they
won’t take into account, unless there is coordinated action. Worse still, each country
will be tempted to maximize its own multiplier by beggar thy neighbor policies, like
the ‘‘buy America’’ provision included in the stimulus package. Although there was
a sigh of relief when additional language was put in suspending that provision, to the
extent that it violated international agreements, curiously this made the provision in
some ways even more invidious, because we have plurilateral government
procurement agreements with other advanced industrial countries but not with
most developing countries. In short, we will discriminate against the poor
developing countries that need our help even more.
If each country only focuses on its own interests, some countries will be tempted
to be free riders. The size of the global stimulus will thus be smaller than needed, and
the global impact will be smaller, as each strives to find those expenditures that have
the largest domestic multipliers, regardless of the global multipliers. There is a huge
difference between domestic and global multipliers, and an effective global response
needs to focus on the global multipliers.
America has a special obligation to behave responsibly. This crisis has a clear
‘‘Made in the USA’’ label on it. We made the toxic mortgages and then exported
them — about half of them, in fact. Once again, we have benefited from
globalization: had we not exported so many, we would have even deeper crisis here.
Our banks would be in even worse trouble. We exported the deregulatory
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philosophy, which meant that many elsewhere didn’t put into place the safeguards
that would have stopped them from buying these toxic products. Now we have
exported our recession.
With President Obama’s election, America has a unique opportunity to repair the
enormous damage to our international relations of the previous 8 years. However,
this opportunity will be lost if we are seen to be advancing our own parochial
interests at the expense of others. It has been commonplace to recite the damage to
the global economy from the Smoot-Hawley tariffs. We are unlikely to do anything
so overt, but intentionally or unintentionally, what we do may have adverse effects
on others. There is concern about what we have done and how we have done it.
Governments have intervened in markets in an almost unprecedented way — and
even as some governments call for more transparency, we have to recognize that
much of what has been done has been highly non-transparent. With expenditures of
this scale and a lack of transparency of this scope, vast opportunities for corruption
and untoward redistributions are opened up. We have been moving in unchartered
territory.
The distortions created in the market economy will be long lasting. There can be
no level playing field, with governments in some developed countries offering multi-
billion dollar subsidies to their enterprises that poor countries simply cannot match.
Even symmetric policies can have asymmetric effects: a government guarantee to a
bank deposit from the US has more credibility than one from a poor developing
country.
Matters are even worse in financial markets, as firms in some developed countries
receive hundreds of billions of dollars of assistance, well beyond the GDP of poorer
countries. Even the knowledge that failure can be met with a bailout changes the
willingness and ability to undertake risk.
The global economic landscape has changed unalterably. We cannot go back to
the world before September 15. The question is, what kind of world will it be?
In the past, the global financial system often worked to the disadvantage of
developing countries. Banks in developed countries, for instance, were encouraged
to lend short term to developing countries; while this provided greater liquidity
to the former, it led to greater instability in the latter. In good years, financial
and capital market liberalization may have provided additional funding to some
developing countries. However, in bad years, the funds that flowed so freely are
withdrawn. Pro-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies were often foisted on
developing countries, while developed countries followed countercyclical policies.
These asymmetries mean that there is greater risk in developing countries, forcing
them to pay a higher cost of capital. Combined with the guarantees and bailouts,
these asymmetries also partially account for the anomalous situation where money is
flowing from developing countries back to the US, from whence the global problems
originated.
It is understandable that each country focus first and foremost on its own citizens
and its own economy, but it would be a mistake not to recognize the consequences of
our actions. At the very least, we may need to provide compensatory payments to
offset the damage that we have done to others. This is not the time to be cutting
back on foreign assistance; this is the time to increase it.
The rest of the world will be watching carefully what the US does. Are we
assuming our responsibilities? How we respond will have much to do not only with
how quickly and robustly the world emerges from this crisis, but also with the nature
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of the global economy in the post crisis world. Will there be closer economic
integration? Or will there be a retreat from globalization?
AMERICA’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
Let me now turn to the three elements of America’s response to the crisis.
The stimulus
Within the economics profession, there is, I think, a clear understanding of what
makes for a good stimulus: it has to work quickly (we say, be timely), it should have
a big bang for the buck, and it should help — and certainly not worsen — our long
run problems. Having a big bang for the buck is especially important because of the
growth in the size of the national debt, from $5.7 trillion in the beginning of the
Bush Administration to over $10 trillion today, with an expected deficit this year of
$1.5 to $2 trillion, depending on how one does the calculations. (If we use standard
accounting procedures, of the kind that the IMF employs, which consolidate
government owned enterprises into the government’s debt, we would have to add
another $5 trillion or so as a result of the government take-over of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.)
But most economists were never enamored of standard government accounting,
which focuses on liabilities and pays no attention to assets. If we spend money to
create assets (new technology, infrastructure, human capital), then these assets offset
the new liabilities, and the national balance sheet can even be strengthened.
These criteria imply that the tax cuts, which comprise about a third of the stimulus
package, don’t make the mark. Americans are likely to save significant fractions of
the tax cut because they are saddled with heavy debt, have uncertainties about access
to credit and job insecurity, and had large fractions of their wealth destroyed
because of falling asset prices. This means that the tax cuts are not likely to provide
much stimulus.
In assessing the appropriate size of the stimulus, we need to take into account the
negative stimulus coming from the automatic destablizers built into state
expenditures. Most states have balanced budget frameworks. This means that when
tax revenues fall — as they do when the economy goes into a recession and
when real estate prices plummet — they either have to cut back on expenditures or
raise taxes. California alone has faced a shortfall of $40 billion. A little while ago,
the shortfall of the States was estimated to be around $150 billion per year; but as
the crisis has deepened, that number has increased. Thus, almost half of the stimulus
simply offsets the negative stimulus coming from the states. We should have enacted
a simple revenue sharing arrangement, making up for states’ revenue shortfalls.
The stimulus package will be helping the states significantly but not enough. Once
we take into account the negative stimulus from the states, we see how inadequate
is our stimulus — a net of 1–2 percent of GDP. (Of course, further stimulus will be
provided by the ‘‘automatic stabilizers’’ built into government programs.)
The question is, what is the magnitude of the potential insufficiency in aggregate
demand? By some reckoning, in the US there has been wealth destruction (not in the
real sense, but in the sense of individuals’ balance sheets) of $15 trillion, an amount
equal to GDP. A reduction of this magnitude could be expected to generate a
reduction in consumption of between 5 and 6 percent of GDP. The drop in
Joseph E. Stiglitz
The Current Economic Crisis
284
Eastern Economic Journal 2009 35
consumption, perhaps over a period of a couple years, may be even larger.
Americans were living beyond their income. They were borrowing to sustain their
living standards, even as median real incomes declined, and now they are declining
even more. It is not just that they won’t be able to borrow because our financial
system is not working the way it should; it is that they won’t want to borrow, to
continue what were clearly unsustainable levels of consumption. Already, the data
show dramatic increases in America’s household savings rates.
Compound this with decreases in investment and exports, and one begins to form
a picture of the severity of the situation.
Focusing on global aggregate demand also helps us think about the recovery.
What will replace the ‘‘housing bubble?’’ Another tech bubble? As I tried to explain
in my book The Three Trillion Dollar War with Linda Bilmes, one of the reasons
for the loose monetary policy that contributed to the bubble was that there would
have been, in the absence of loose monetary policy, an insufficiency of aggregate
demand.
As long as the dollar remains the reserve currency of choice, there will be
a demand to increase dollar holdings — which means the exchange rate will be such
as to ensure that imports exceed exports. Reserves increased enormously after the
East Asia crisis, as countries learned the risks of the loss of economic sovereignty in
a crisis. It was individually rational for each country to increase reserves, but it
was systemically costly. Because there is a real risk that this crisis will not be handled
well either, the demand for reserves may increase even further.
Growing inequality too has contributed to the lack of aggregate demand. We have
redistributed income from those who would spend it to those that don’t. For a
while, we thought we could circumvent the problem by allowing Americans at the
bottom and middle to continue spending anyway, by borrowing. But that was not
sustainable.
So far, little, if anything, is being done to address either of these fundamental
problems. And that means that even after we fix our financial system, there is little
basis for optimism about a return to robust growth.
Our foreclosure problem
It seemed remarkable to me that we waited so long to do anything about the
foreclosure problem, which in a sense was at the root of the financial sector’s
problem. We were pouring money into the banking system. It was like a mass blood
transfusion to a patient who was suffering from internal hemorrhaging, without
doing anything about the underlying problem.
Now, at last, we have begun to do something. We need to make housing more
affordable to lower and middle-income Americans, and we have to quickly
restructure many of the mortgages that are underwater. If we don’t, every month
more homes will go into foreclosure. Millions will lose their homes, and with that,
their life savings. Meanwhile, as families are being forced out of their homes, the
homes get trashed and gutted; in some communities, the government has finally
stepped in — to remove the remains. In others, the blight spreads, and so even those
who have been model citizens, borrowing prudently and maintaining their homes,
find markets values depreciating beyond their worst nightmares.
We have on our hands a social and human tragedy.
One way we can make housing more affordable is to convert the mortgage tax
deduction into a cashable tax credit. Right now, we pay 50 percent of the costs
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(interest and real estate) of upper middle-income Americans, but nothing for poor
Americans. This is neither equitable nor efficient.
Another way is to make some of the low cost capital that we have been giving
so generously to our big banks available to lower and middle-income homeowners.
We are beginning to expand these programs, but not widely enough.
There are a number of easy ways of dealing with the foreclosure problem — such
as bailing out the lenders at the same time as writing down the loans — which, in the
absence of budget constraints and worries about future moral hazard, would make
everyone (other than the ordinary taxpayer) happy. Individuals could stay in their
homes, and lenders would avoid taking a hit to their balance sheets. Knowing that
the government is taking this risk off of balance sheets would contribute to
alleviating the credit crunch.
The challenge is how to save the homes of the hundreds of thousands of those who
otherwise would lose their homes, and not bail out the lenders, who should be made
to bear the consequences of their failures to assess risk. (Clearly, borrowers also
share in the blame, but, for the most part, the lenders were, or should have been,
far more financially sophisticated than the borrowers, especially most of those
taking out sub-prime mortgages.)
One critical part of the answer is a ‘‘homeowners’ Chapter 11’’ — a speedy
restructuring of liabilities of poorer homeowners, modeled on the kind of relief that
we provide for corporations who cannot meet their debt obligations. Chapter 11 is
premised on the idea that keeping a firm going is critical for the firms’ workers and
other stakeholders. The firm’s management can propose a corporate reorganization
that the Courts review. If found acceptable, there is a quick discharge of debt — the
corporation is given a fresh start. The homeowners’ Chapter 11 is premised on the
idea that no one gains from forcing a homeowner out of his home. There are large
transactions costs associated with foreclosure, and typically, following foreclosure,
there is a deterioration in house maintenance and adverse effects on the community.
Right now, we make it more difficult for a family to restructure their mortgage
than to restructure what they owe on a yacht. Individuals should not be forced to
go through an entire bankruptcy proceeding to restructure their housing debt, and
that is the intent of the homeowners’ Chapter 11.
One of the objections to these restructuring proposals is that speculators as well as
true homeowners may reap the benefits. It is the latter, of course, whose welfare is of
particular concern. One way of addressing the problem is to restrict eligibility to
those who are and have been living in their home. Only primary residences would be
eligible.
But there is a second approach, based on the general theory of self selection. After
the write down, the lender would retain a share (perhaps all) of the capital gain, to
be paid when the property is sold. Speculators would have little (or no) interest in
participating, since the debt restructuring would take away most or all of his
speculative gains. (This makes this financial restructuring fully analogous to
corporate restructuring.)
Financial sector reorganization
Financial markets are supposed to allocate capital and manage risk. America’s
financial markets did neither well. Products were created which were so complicated
that not even those that created them fully understood their risk implications; risk
has been amplified, not managed. But meanwhile, products that should have been
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created — to help ordinary citizens manage the important risks that they confront —
were not.
No one can claim that financial markets did a stellar job in allocating resources in
the late 1990s, with 97 percent of the investments in fiber optics taking years to see
any light. However, at least that mistake had an unintended benefit: as the costs of
interconnections were driven down, India and China became more integrated into
the global economy. This time, there were some short-term benefits from the excess
investments in real estate, as some Americans enjoyed the pleasures of home
ownership and living in a bigger home than they otherwise would have — for a few
months. But at what a cost to themselves and the world economy!
We forgot that a financial system is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Indeed,
the output of the financial sector in good accounting systems is treated as an
intermediate good. Whatever benefits there are should be reflected in the higher
output that its risk management and capital allocation services facilitate. A good
financial system should be one that provides these services at low cost — using little
of society’s resources. Our financial system used up huge resources (or at least
transferred large amounts of resources from other parts of the economy to itself),
but didn’t do what it should have done in return.
American banks mismanaged risk on a colossal scale, with global consequences.
Meanwhile, those running these institutions have walked away with billions of
dollars in compensation. By some estimates, close to 40 percent of corporate profits
in recent years have accrued to the financial sector. To be sure, financial markets
played an important role in providing finance to the truly innovative parts of the
American economy, through venture capital firms, and these have been well
rewarded for their services. But this is only a small part of America’s financial
system. From a systemic perspective, there appears to be a mismatch between social
and private returns — and unless social and private returns are closely aligned, the
market system cannot work well.
As we approach the problem of bailing out the banks, we should have begun by
asking, what kind of financial system do we want in the future? Do we want to
replicate the flawed model that got us into this mess? Should we return to a more
bank-based lending system, or continue the securities based system? Almost 20 years
ago, at the beginning of the era of securitization, I predicted that there was a good
chance that it would end in disaster, as investors underestimated the problems posed
by information asymmetries, the risks of price declines, and the extent to which risks
are correlated. I was, regrettably, right.
Today, the issue on the table is what to do with our failing banks. At last, people
are beginning to talk about the possibility of nationalization. Yet the Administra-
tion seems reluctant. I believe that the result is that we will fail in the twin objectives
set out by President Obama: restart lending and preserve our nation’s financial
well-being. Under current proposals, there will not be a robust recovery of lending,
and yet our national debt will soar, compromising our ability to achieve the many
other lofty goals that the President set out so clearly and forcefully.
The banks have succeeded in instilling fear of bankruptcy and nationalization.
I want to explain why both fears are unfounded and why temporary nationalization
may be the only rational course of action. I want to present what I call Plan B — an
alternative to the series of ad hoc measures that have characterized the bank bailouts
since they began. But first, I want to spend a few minutes setting the scene and laying
out a few principles and criteria for what defines a good plan.
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The unwarranted fear of financial reorganization. Financial reorganization is
a standard part of modern capitalism that is necessary and inevitable when a firm’s
liabilities are in excess of its assets. In the case of banks, financial reorganization
occurs prior to the certainty that the bank’s assets are short of the liabilities, because
of the risk of malfeasance and excessive risk taking (‘‘gambling on resurrection’’) for
undercapitalized institutions.
A second difference with standard financial reorganization arises from the fact
that the government insures deposits, which are the most important class of
liabilities of a bank. The government, however, does not insure other claimants,
including equity holders.
Long experience has shown that financial reorganization can be done in ways with
minimal trauma to the economy; even when there is extensive trauma (as in
Argentina), the economy can recover relatively quickly. Experience too shows that
delay can be extremely costly, both to the bank, in terms of the fiscal burdens
when the financial reorganization eventually occurs, and to the economy, because
during the interim there may be insufficient lending and because, as I noted,
undercapitalized banks (zombie banks) have an incentive to engage in excessive
risk taking and fraudulent behavior.
The unwarranted fear of temporary nationalization. Temporary government
management can and has been done both abroad and in America in ways that
avoid politically connected lending, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Indeed, in
the experience of many countries, replacing old management and providing better
incentive structures can lead to improvement in performance. Of course, the
performance of America’s financial institutions over the past 5 years sets, indeed, a
very low bar. Moreover, the idea that reorganization means long-term government
ownership is just wrong.
The government is, in fact, already actively involved in lending (through the Fed)
and has totally distorted risk markets. How the government resolves the current
crisis may impair the ability of risk markets to perform their essential credit and
risk allocation functions for years to come. Markets are now pricing not the intrinsic
risk of the asset or activity but the risk of a government bailout. More extensive
bailouts will heighten this political and non-economic aspect of risk assessment.
Much of what we have done in the last few months has been motivated by
irrational fear — fear that if we do not bail out the banks, there will be economic
collapse, and fear that if we nationalize the banks, it will be the end of capitalism
as we know it. To be sure, what we have done in the last few months has changed the
nature of capitalism as we have known it. We have socialized losses, while leaving
profits in the private sector. This form of ersatz capitalism, or corporate welfarism,
call it what you will, is doomed to failure. It will result in resources being
misallocated and wealth being redistributed in adverse ways.
Most importantly, we have failed even to distinguish between saving the banks
and saving the bankers and particular categories of claimants (such as equity
holders).
Criteria
The purpose of a bailout — from the national perspective — is not enhancing the
well-being of our bankers who have served our country so poorly. Nor is the
purpose the enrichment of the shareholders, who made ample gains in the heady
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days prior to the crisis. This means, of course, that what happens to their stock price
is not a good barometer of a good plan. Indeed, we should be worried by any plan
that sees bank shares rise, as the plan announced by Treasury does.
There are four key criteria:
1. Is there a rekindling of good lending? (It is not hard to restart lending — if the
government bears all or most of the risk. This means that there have to be
appropriate incentives in place.)
2. Is the cost to the government the smallest possible?
The cost to the government is especially important, given the legacy of debt from
the Bush Administration which I noted earlier. The $350 billion that has already
gone out the door under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is a reminder
how quickly the government can go through money with little to show for it.
President Obama has laid out these principles, but, as I shall shortly explain, the
bailouts do not measure up to the mark. But there are two other criteria that are
also important.
3. The solution to the current problem should make it less likely, not more likely,
that we have problems in the future. The agglomeration of banks — making them
even more too big to fail — is a concern. The way we have been bailing out the
bankers and their shareholders is giving rise to unnecessarily large problems of
moral hazard going forward.
4. The bailout should conform to high standards of transparency and good
governance. What we have done has provided a model to other countries — of
what should not be done, except in one respect: the Congressional Oversight
Panel, which is finally beginning to shed some light on the extent to which the
American people have been cheated and continue to be cheated.
Principles to guide restructuring
There are eight equally simple principles.
1. Conservation of matter.Moving assets and liabilities around, to a first order, does
not create value. When the government insures the losses of, say, Citibank, the
losses don’t disappear. They simply move from Citibank’s balance sheet to the
government’s balance sheet — but because of government accounting, we may
not be fully aware of this. Similarly, if we remove toxic assets from the banks’
balance sheets, the toxic assets haven’t disappeared. They are as much a part of
the economy as they were before. If we move them to a Bad Bank, they appear on
the balance sheet of the ‘‘Bad Bank’’ — under most proposals, again, with losses
to be borne by taxpayers.
2. This means the real battle is thus about redistribution: who bears the losses? Will
it be shifted away from the financial sector onto the public? In a zero sum world,
a better deal for the banks means a worse deal for the taxpayers.
That is why what has been happening is so troubling. The Congressional
Oversight Panel reported that in the major transactions under TARP, the US got
about 67 cents on the dollar in preferred shares — but what we got has since sunk
in value, as many of us expected would happen. We got a raw deal.
But what happened under the Bush Administration may look good in
comparison to what was announced in the third Citibank bailout, which allows
Citibank to convert preferred shares to common shares. While the full calculation
of the value of the deal will take a while, preliminary calculations suggest we are
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getting something like 25 cents on the dollar. If those representing us in the
government had been working for Wall Street, and this is the best their
bargaining could have done, they would have long ago been fired.
3. Trickle down economics is in general inefficient. If one is worried about the
consequences of a decrease in the value of, for example, a bond held by an
insurance company, it is not a good use of taxpayers’ money to preserve all
bondholders. It is better to focus attention on those who are specifically in need.
There is worry, for instance, that if we do not bail out all creditors, some
insurance and pension funds may experience significant losses. They are being put
forward as ‘‘socially worthy’’ claimants. But already, there is discussion of cut
backs in social security. The funds that might trickle down to these private
claimants are funds that might go to strengthen the social security system,
avoiding deeper cutbacks. To which should we give greater weight, those to
whom we have made a social contract, or those who have made bad investment
decisions? In the end, there will have to be shared sacrifice. Plan B is an attempt at
a fair and equitable solution, and one that is consistent (so far as possible) with
principles of market economics. If we need to rescue pension funds and or
insurance companies, then we should do so directly, where every dollar of
government money goes directly to the group that needs it. Spending $20 to bail
out investors so that $1 can go to a pension fund is foolish.
4. Incentives matter — and if we don’t get incentives right, we won’t have good
outcomes. Bailouts represent nearly a zero sum game. However, if they are not
structured correctly, there can be a negative sum game. For instance, some of
the proposals being bandied around entail the federal government providing
insurance against losses. This, of course, increases a virulent version of the moral
hazard problem — when market participants don’t bear the full consequences of
their actions, they are likely to take actions that are not in the overall interests
of society. Insurance gives rise to moral hazard problems. More generally,
systems in which ownership and control are disparate give rise to perverse
outcomes.
5. Lending is a matter not just of the ability of the banks to lend, but also of their
willingness to do so. Other factors besides the ability to lend affect lending:
specifically, the riskiness of the banks’ balance sheets and the riskiness of new
lending. The promised positive sum benefits from an improvement in banks’
balance sheets will not arise if new lending is viewed to be excessively risky.
It is apparent that those structuring these programs have not thought deeply
about the determinants of credit flows. In fact, these concerns should be at the
center of any monetary theory. Bruce Greenwald and I, in our book Towards a
New Paradigm of Monetary Economics [2003], explain the other factors that affect
lending — among which is the risk, which has only grown worse as the economy’s
woes have deepened.
6. Look to the future, not the past. We need to be looking forward, not looking
back — there is a basic principle in economics that bygone are bygones. Yet most
of our attention is focused on the past and is not forward looking. Instead
of trying to save all existing banks, consider what we might have done with
$700 billion had we established a set of new banks, or given it to the few healthy
and well-managed banks. At a modest 12 to 1 leverage, that would have
generated $8.4 trillion of new credit — more than enough for our economy’s
needs. Even if we had not done anything so dramatic, using more of the money
to absorb some of the uncertainty of new loans — as some governments are
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doing — would have yielded far higher social returns than America’s failed
strategy while forcing appropriate discipline on the banks, rewarding those that
had been prudent and letting fail those that had taken extraordinary risk.
7. Financial reorganizations — giving a fresh start — are not the end of the world.
Indeed, it can represent the beginning of a new world, one in which incentives are
better aligned and in which lending will be rekindled. Financial reorganization
has become a fact of life in many industries, such as the airline industry; many
banks have been smoothly reorganized — a period during which the government
runs them is followed by privatization. With failed management bearing the
consequences of the mistakes and with past obligations reduced, the banks
are able to ‘‘move on.’’ Customers can be served better, and investors will be
more willing to put money into such a restructured organization.
8. The Polluter Pays Principle. In environmental economics, there is a basic
principle, called the Polluter Pays: it is not just a matter of equity but also
a matter of efficiency. American banks have polluted the global economy with
toxic waste, and it is a matter of equity and efficiency — and of playing by the
rules — that they must be forced, now or later, to pay the price. This is not
the first time that American banks have been bailed out. It has happened
repeatedly. The implication is that, in effect, this sector is being heavily subsidized
by the rest of the economy. Only by making sure that the sector pays the full costs
of its actions will efficiency be restored.
An outline of a plan
1. Assessment of viability of banks; those banks that are not viable should be given
short notice to find sufficient funds to recapitalize to an adequate level or be taken
over. This assessment should be based both on stress tests and on a valuation of
assets on a mark to market basis. Both of these methodologies have flaws and
limits; the combination, especially if the stress test is done against a ‘‘tough’’
scenario of a prolonged downturn with marked declines in real estate prices and
marked increases in unemployment and default rates, should give us more
confidence in the results. The problem is that the models used in the past for
stress testing were badly flawed — what confidence do we have that they will do
better going forward than they have in the past?
2. Deposits and other liabilities for which the government has already issued
guarantees would be fully honored. Other liabilities would be divided into three
categories: A, B, and C. Category A, the most senior or whose failure would pose
the most systemic risk, would be fully insured, upon payment of a 10 percent
insurance premium. Categories B and C would similarly be insured for 2/3 and 1/3
of their face value, upon payment of a 10 percent insurance premium. This would
provide surety and liquidity to the market, without imposing undue and
unwarranted costs on the government for picking up liabilities for which it has no
responsibility.
3. Deposits in foreign branches and subsidiaries would be fully guaranteed upon the
payment of the 10 percent insurance premium (Anti-contagion provision). The US
Government, perhaps through the Fed, would make available financing for
countries to pay the premium, with the repayment subtracted from the actual
payments made under this provision. This facility might be extended to other
foreign creditors, particularly from developing countries.
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4. The fully insured liabilities and the ‘‘good assets’’ — those that can be valued with
some degree of certainty — would be stripped out of the failed institution, forming a
Good Bank. The remaining assets and liabilities would remain with the Bad Bank.
The Bad Bank would provide an insurance policy to the Good Bank on the value
of the assets stripped out, analogous to that provided by the government to
Citibank (the Good Bank would bear the first 10 percent of losses, the Bad Bank
all losses in excess of that). If the value of the assets exceeds the value of the
liabilities, the Good Bank would pay the Bad Bank the difference; in the reverse
case, the difference would be a senior liability of the Bad Bank. Shareholders in
the Bad Bank would be given a rights issue to recapitalize the Good Bank to a
high level, well in excess of that required to weather a strenuous stress test. The
Government would provide any deficiency in capitalization and receive
proportionate voting shares. The Bank would be run on Commercial Principles.
5. The Bad Bank, undercapitalized, would not be able to accept deposits. It would be
responsible for unwinding the assets, charged with maximizing the value to the
claimants, with claimants satisfied in the order stipulated by the Bankruptcy
proceedings.
6. Derivative and other positions would be netted and closed out, with any shortfalls
owed to others being treated as claimants according to standard Bankruptcy
proceedings.
7. Any State Insurance Fund bearing losses that are beyond its ability to pay as a
result of the default on senior debt might apply for funds from a Compensation
Fund, to be established out of a 10 percent levy on the net profits of any Good Banks
established during these Proceedings. The Compensation Fund could pay up to
one-third of the short fall, with one-third being borne by the State and one-third by
the Policy Holder, for policies up to a limit to be determined. Similar provisions
might be adopted for insured pension funds or other entities.
Plan B would provide security to the market, without rewarding those that have
been speculating on a government bailout of bonds. It is not only sensitive to the
global ramifications of the failure of a major international bank and to our
responsibility to try to maintain stability of global financial markets, but it is also
sensitive to the limited responsibility of American taxpayers to compensate for bad
investment decisions made either in America or abroad. Finally, it is sensitive to the
social consequences of a default, reflecting the principle of shared sacrifice but
targeting the sacrifice of American taxpayers towards those who are more deserving
or in need.
There are many variants of restructuring. Plan B is presented to show that there
are concrete alternatives to the current strategy. Each of us may have our own
preferred variation, but the point is that this approach, whatever the variation, is
more likely to be better in achieving our national objectives than Plan A — the
constantly evolving sets of plans that have only one thing in common: the avoidance
of temporary nationalization. As President Obama has often said, we need bold
action; inaction is not an option. But it matters which action. There are risks in any
course of action, but Plan A, while it risks failing to restart lending, also risks a
vastly larger national debt at the end of the day. The chorus calling for some version
of Plan B is growing daily.
Joseph E. Stiglitz
The Current Economic Crisis
292
Eastern Economic Journal 2009 35
LESSONS FOR ECONOMICS
I want to turn now to my second topic — lessons of this economic crisis for
economics. The Great Depression transformed economics. Even as the economy
sunk into depression, the mainstream of the economics profession argued that
nothing should be done, as government intervention would only make things worse.
As the depression faded into distant memory, the economics profession lost sight
of these lessons. Dogmas and doctrines holding that markets worked well and that
they were self-correcting once again came to predominate. This time, the theories
were more sophisticated, but the underlying assumptions were equally irrelevant.
These ideas helped shaped the intellectual milieu which gave rise to the flawed
policies that, in turn, gave rise to the crisis, and to some extent, they are shaping
policies today as we attempt to respond to the crisis.
The advocates of perfect markets in all their versions say that crises are rare events
— though they have been happening with increasing frequency, as we change rules
to reflect beliefs in perfect markets. I would argue that economists, like doctors, have
much to learn from pathology: we see more clearly in these unusual events how
the economy really functions.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, a peculiar doctrine came to be accepted,
called the neo-classical synthesis. It argued that once markets were restored to full
employment, neo-classical principles would apply — the economy would be
efficient. We should be clear: it was not a theorem but a belief. The idea was always
suspect — why should market failures only occur in big doses? Rather, recessions
can be seen as the tip of the iceberg; underneath are many ‘‘smaller’’ market failures,
giving rise in the aggregate to huge inefficiencies — illustrated by a myriad of tax
paradoxes.
We should remember too that while mega-failures have been rare in the US, on a
global scale failures have in fact been frequent. This is just the largest and most
recent of financial crises — and bailouts. Beyond America’s S & L debacle are
bailouts with country names (Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Indonesia, Argentina,
Thailand, Russia, etc.), which were really bailouts of western lenders, a result of
inadequate assessment of credit worthiness. The main difference between these crises
and the current one is that consequences were felt in ‘‘periphery’’ — and the costs of
bailouts were largely borne in the periphery.
The irony, of course, was that other strands of modern economic theory,
including the theory of imperfect information to which I have contributed, were
simultaneously explaining why markets often do not work so well. Bruce Greenwald
and I, for instance, showed that the reason that Adam Smith’s invisible hand often
appeared invisible was that it was not actually there: market equilibria were not
constrained Pareto efficient whenever there were information imperfections and
asymmetries and imperfect risk markets — that is always. At the same time, the
most successful countries — ever — in growth and poverty reduction, the countries
of East Asia, followed policies with active government involvement. One would
have thought that this powerful combination of theory and evidence might have
dampened the enthusiasm for unfettered and under-regulated markets. But evidently
it did not. I understand the unbridled enthusiasm of special interests, which found
the arguments for deregulation profit enhancing; I am not so clear what motivated
so many economists.
Some have argued that risk is the price we have to pay for innovation, and
America’s financial markets have been extraordinarily innovative. However,
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financial markets did not create risk products that would have enabled individuals
to manage the risks that they faced — the simple risk of home ownership.
Rather, the innovations consisted mostly of tax, regulatory, and accounting
arbitrage. Their financial alchemy — converting F-rated toxic mortgages into
financial products that could be held by fiduciaries — had a private (but not
necessarily social) pay-off. Such repackaging, we know from the Modigliani Miller
theorem, should have at most limited value. Meanwhile, many in the financial sector
actually resisted innovations that would have made markets work better —
innovations like GDP and inflation indexed bonds, Danish mortgage bonds, and
better auctions of Treasury Bills.
The models that have predominated within macro-economics, which assume
representative agents with rational expectations, are particularly disturbing. What I
find even more striking is that some economists still argue that this crisis has not
shaken their belief in rational expectations.
To me, the evidence of irrationality, and intellectual inconsistency, abounds. To
give a few examples:
Markets believed that real estate prices could continue to go up — a necessary
belief for the toxic mortgages not to blow up — and yet the real incomes of most
Americans were decreasing.
Markets seemed to systematically ignore the possibility of highly correlated
movements in housing prices, even though these prices are affected by interest rates
that are determined nationally and by the overall business cycle, and markets
seemed to ignore even the possibility of ‘‘contagion’’ from the interconnectivity of
economic activity and expectations.
‘‘Once in a lifetime’’ events happened every 10 years. They should have used fat-
tailed distributions rather than lognormal distributions. There already were several
instances of failures from using these models — evidently, financial markets did not
learn.
Markets offered 100 percent or more non-recourse mortgages. They should have
recognized that (at least with rational buyers) these were an option, with positive
value: they were giving away money. It is not the standard model of banks to give
away money — at least to poor people who they do not know. Both investors and
regulators should have smelled that something was wrong.
Advocates of the new products argued that they were transforming the economy
— it was only by such fundamental transformation could one justify the high
salaries they were receiving. Yet in modeling, they used past data that, implicitly,
assumed nothing had changed.
However, something had changed — new asymmetries of information had been
created, which investors did not fully appreciate and did not take into account in
their modeling. Mortgages were given with much higher default rates.
The system was rife with perverse incentives — on the part of rating agencies,
on the part of mortgage originators, on the part of those participating in
securitization, and on the part of banks. There were conflicts of interest, incentives
to provide distorted information, and incentives to engage in short sighted and
excessively risky behavior. But somehow, investors — the other side of each of these
transactions — irrationally assumed that these perverse incentives had no adverse
effects.
We allowed banks to get too big to fail but failed to take into account the effects
that that would have on their behavior.
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Derivatives have played an important role in amplifying the crisis. The big banks
failed to net out derivative positions. Evidently, they failed to recognize the
importance of counterparty risk, even as they were betting on the failures of
counterparties — another example of intellectual incoherence.
I could go on, but the point should be clear: even if individuals were acting in
ways that were individually rational, the outcomes were not systemically rational.
Even today, flawed thinking continues. We are encouraging mergers among the
big banks that cause them to be even bigger. We talk about tight regulation of
systemically significant institutions, failing to note that there can be systemic effects
of correlated behavior on the part of individual institutions, even if each is not
systemically significant.
Representative agent models ignore the rich diversity of our economy — a
diversity that is at the heart of some of the problems it faces. An economy with a
single individual has no lenders and no borrowers, no problems of asymmetric
information (unless individuals are subject to schizophrenia), no need for banks, no
need to ascertain creditworthiness — in short, it is missing everything that is
important. Remarkably, much of the economics profession focused on models that
have almost nothing to say about the crisis we are facing.
There were alternative strands of thought. Minsky has come back into fashion.
Greenwald and Stiglitz developed formal models of debt deflation and a theory of
monetary policy focusing on the role of credit. With Gallegati and other co-authors,
we have explored the credit interlinkages that have played such an important role in
this crisis. These models explore the possibility of bankruptcy cascades. They explain
how global financial integration may serve not only to share risk but also to
facilitate contagion, as a failure in one part of the economic system — in this case,
the US — spreads around the world.1 Neo-classical models argued that
globalization inevitably led to more stability. Even before this crisis, there was
mounting evidence to the contrary.
Let me turn now to monetary policy. Much of the profession focused again on
simplistic models worried about the fourth order distortionary effects of low
inflation, while ignoring the first order systemic effects of market fragility. They
seemed to believe that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient to ensure
high growth and economic stability. They were clearly wrong. Worse, excessive
focus on inflation may have distracted attention from what was going on — because
inflation was low, they felt content even as leverage and risk was exceeding all
reasonable bounds.
There are other arguments against inflation targeting — especially in open,
developing countries. Those countries that tried to dampen this imported inflation
were distorting their economy; nothing they could do would affect the prices of oil
or food. In some cases, only 25 percent of the prices were directly affected by
the high interest rates — to bring down average inflation imposed an enormous
price on those sectors at the time. But the high interest rates led to high exchange
rates, which have now fallen, subjecting the real sector to huge volatility.
The attempt to stabilize inflation has served to destabilize the overall economy.
Let me conclude. Hopefully, we will learn, at least for a while, some important
lessons from this crisis. Unfettered financial markets do not work, and the current
regulation and regulatory institutions failed — partly because one is not likely to get
effective regulation when there are regulators who do not believe in regulation.
Markets are not self-adjusting, at least in the relevant time frame.
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More broadly, Darwinian natural selection may not work. Rather, like Gresham’s
law — which holds that bad money drives out good — reckless firms forced more
conservative firms to follow similarly reckless investment strategies. More prudent
firms might have done better in the long run but could not survive to take advantage
of that long run.
Our financial system failed in its core missions — allocating capital and managing
risk — with disastrous economic and social consequences, not just the misallocated
capital of the past but the huge disparity between potential and actual GDP in the
coming years, sums in the trillions of dollars. Regrettably, flawed economic theories
aided and abetted both those in the public and in the private sector in pursuing
policies that, almost inevitably, led to the current calamity.
We need to do a better job of managing our economy, but this will require better
research that is less framed by the flawed models of the past, less driven by simplistic
ideas, and more attuned to the realities of today. There is a rich research agenda
ahead.
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